Analysis of the Regulation of Beachfront Development in South Carolina by Smith, Newman J.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 42 Issue 3 Article 6 
Spring 1991 
Analysis of the Regulation of Beachfront Development in South 
Carolina 
Newman J. Smith 
Columbia, SC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Newman Jackson Smith, Analysis of the Regulation of Beachfront Development in South Carolina, 42 S. 
C. L. Rev. 717 (1991). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 





Counties and municipalities typically regulate real estate develop-
ment in South Carolina. Counties and municipalities develop and im-
plement zoning and land use planning schemes that control building
height, density, and other aspects of development on private property.1
Regulation of development, or zoning, is founded upon the police
power. Regulation is designed to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare.2
Police power is exercised in two ways. First, the power of eminent
domain authorizes the government to purchase private property for
public use.3 Second, police power regulations provide other public ben-
efits that are derived by controlling the use of private property rather
than purchasing the property.4 If regulation of private property de-
prives the owner of all beneficial uses, however, then a compensable
taking may occur.
5
In South Carolina regulation of beachfront development at the
state level began in September 1977 with the passage of the South Car-
olina Coastal Management Act (Act).6 The Act included "beaches" and
"primary ocean front sand dunes" as "critical areas"' subject to direct
permitting requirements.8 These areas were quite small, however, and
included only fragile natural resources. Sand dunes were protected
from alterations other than construction of elevated walkways for
* Associate, Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Columbia, South Carolina.
B.S. 1974, University of South Carolina; J.D. 1978, University of South Carolina.
1. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 6-7-710 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
2. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. See Karesh v. City Council, 271 S.C. 339, 342, 247 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1978).
4. See Bob Jones Univ., Inc. v. City of Greenville, 243 S.C. 351, 360, 133 S.E.2d
843, 847 (1963), appeal dismissed, 378 U.S. 581 (1964).
5. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
6. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
7. Id. § 48-39-10(J).
8. Id. § 48-39-130.
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beach access purposes.9 Beaches were less protected from alterations
because nourishment projects, sand scraping, and erosion control struc-
tures were allowed. 10
The Coastal Council regulated the location of the critical area line
on the beach and dunes." However, these natural resources were sub-
ject to change from storms, high tides, and other shoreline processes.
This meant that the critical area line could and did move, sometimes
rapidly. The beachfront critical area line was determined by locating
one of four possible locations on a particular beach or sand dune.
These locations were: (a) the highest uprush of the waves if no primary
oceanfront sand dune existed and no maritime vegetation was present,
(b) the landward trough of the primary front row sand dune if the
crest of that dune was within two hundred feet of the mean high water
mark, (c) the seaward side of any maritime forest or other nonshore
vegetation if such vegetation was reached before the primary front row
sand dune, or (d) the seaward side of any permanent man-made struc-
ture. 2 Where there was no existing erosion control structure, and
neither a primary oceanfront sand dune nor vegetation was within two
hundred feet of the mean high water mark, the highest uprush of the
waves, or high tide line, limited the Coastal Council's jurisdiction along
the Atlantic Ocean. Using these criteria, council employees determined
the location of the critical area line.
As a result of these definitions, the beach critical area line was set
at either the high tide line erosional escarpment, or the edge of non-
shore vegetation; the trough of the largest dune; the upper edge of a
revetment; or the face of a seawall. A Coastal Council employee estab-
lished the critical area line for each individual property owner on a
case-by-case basis. Because areas without erosion control structures
changed, different critical area lines could be established for the same
property at different points in time. The 1977 Act established no fixed
lines in the sand.
Section 48-39-12013 and regulation 30-131" permitted erosion con-
trol structures to be constructed on the beach. Until 1987 the Coastal
Council routinely issued permits for erosion control structures on the
beach. The controlling regulation 30-13(A)(1)(g) stated:
Erosion control structures should not normally be approved except
when erosion imminently threatens permanent improvements, includ-
9. Id. § 48-39-130(D)(5).
10. See S.C. CODE REGs. 30-13 (1976).
11. See id. 30-1(C)(2), (12), -10(B).
12. Id.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
14. S.C. CODE REGs. 30-13 (1976).
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ing but not limited to buildings, paved parking lots, swimming pools,
etc., which existed on the subject property 90 days after adoption of
this regulation; or, in the case of protecting property adjacent to ex-
isting erosion control structures; or, in the case of structures specifi-
cally called for in an approved erosion control plan.15
The Coastal Council's requirements for erosion control structure
permits were more lenient prior to this regulation. This regulation pur-
ported to prohibit erosion control structures. However, approval of the
structures continued under the second exception of the regulation.
This exception allowed construction of erosion control structures to
protect property adjacent to existing erosion control structures. As a
result of this exception, erosion control structures proliferated wher-
ever erosion threatened permanent improvements.
Because of the winter storms of December 1986 and the syzygy1 6
of January 1, 1987,17 the Coastal Council stiffened its standards for ap-
proval of erosion control structures. The Council interpreted the "im-
minently threatens" language of the regulation18 to prohibit erosion
control structures except when the ocean reaches within ten feet of the
foundation of a habitable structure. 9 Under the Council's new inter-
pretation, a sea wall on the beach could not be rebuilt at its original
site if it were destroyed. The property owner could rebuild the wall;
however, the new wall had to be built within ten feet of the property
owner's house. Following the 1986 and 1987 winter storms, property
owners could only construct revetments; vertical seawalls were
prohibited. 0
Several factors caused the Coastal Council to stiffen its standards
concerning permits for erosion control structures. One factor was the
proliferation of seawalls under its prior policy. A second factor was the
increasing awareness that vertical seawalls accelerate the erosion of the
beach by lowering the beach face in front of the walls. Finally, the reg-
15. Id. 30-13(A)(1)(g).
16. Syzygy is the nearly straight-line configuration of three celestial bodies (e.g.,
the Sun, Moon, and Earth during a solar or lunar eclipse) in a gravitational system.
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1199 (9th ed. 1986).
17. These events caused significant damages to sea walls, buildings, and pools even
though hurricane forces were not involved. Concern over improvements located too close
to the beach, which could be subject to such damage, was a significant factor in the
change in Council policy.
18. S.C. CODE REGs. 30-13(A)(1)(g) (1976).
19. The Coastal Council Permitting Committee adopted this guideline. The Com-
mittee adopted ten feet as the proper measurement after the original proposal of three to
five feet was determined to cause problems with the stability of structural foundations.
20. The Coastal Council Permitting Committee adopted the policy of providing
erosion relief only with sloping structures because of the perceived problems caused by
vertical structures, such as lowering of the public beach.
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ulation offered no logical end to the proliferation of seawalls. 21
In 1987 the Coastal Council formed a Blue Ribbon Committee2 2 to
study erosion control and make recommendations to the Council. Mo-
tivated by an awareness that erosion control structures accelerate
beach erosion, the Blue Ribbon Committee focused primarily on
prohibiting new erosion control structures.
The Council was concerned with not allowing future development
in areas vulnerable to erosion. Under the 1977 Act, the Council could
establish critical area lines for eroding areas where the primary sand
dune was destroyed only at the high tide line.23 Developers frequently
would construct multistory hotels or condominiums one foot behind
this critical area line. The developers would submit a permit applica-
tion for an erosion control structure within the first year, or sometimes
within the first month, after construction began. The developers' ac-
tions caused grave public concern for the future of South Carolina's
public beaches and corresponding tourism revenue. The Blue Ribbon
Committee responded by recommending a setback program which
would move development back from the beach.24 By keeping develop-
ment back, the natural erosion cycle could move the shoreline without
causing significant property damage.
The Blue Ribbon Committee further recommended that the
Coastal Council's jurisdiction be expanded. The Committee recom-
mended that the Council be given the authority to regulate develop-
ment not only on the dunes themselves, but on the land behind the
dunes as well. Although such a proposal was a radical departure from
existing South Carolina policy, the Coastal Council adopted the recom-
mendation and sent it to the state legislature.
Before the legislature could respond to the proposal, however, the
Council expanded its own power through its permit system by setting
its jurisdictional beach critical area line as far landward as possible,
especially after storm events. The Council's old standards for granting
erosion control structure permits had resulted in numerous appeals of
decisions before the Council; nevertheless, no significant beach-related
court actions took place until the Council stiffened its position con-
cerning erosion control structures in response to the winter storms of
December 1986 and January 1987. Several court actions were filed fol-
lowing the Council's response to the storms, but all of the actions were
21. See S.C. CODE REGS. 30-13 (1976).
22. Coastal Council Chairman Sen. James M. Waddell, Jr. appointed twenty-five
committee members from a variety of backgrounds to develop recommendations to aid
the Council in its management of South Carolina's coastal resources.
23. See supra text accompanying note 12.
24. See SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL, COASTAL COUNCIL EROSION CONTROL
BLUE RIBBON COrAMITrTEE REPORT (March 1987).
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settled when the Council allowed the rebuilding of the damaged struc-
tures under the condition that sand was placed on the beach in front of
the structures on an annual basis.25
Unless property owners sued, however, the Coastal Council pre-
vented the owners from rebuilding erosion control structures as they
had previously existed. The Council used the ten-foot "imminently
threatening" definition to determine where revetments could be re-
built." To make its permit decisions, the Coastal Council used the un-
derlying premise that the critical area line moved landward because of
the destruction of an erosion control structure. This premise was indi-
rectly challenged in litigation, but the courts never addressed the issue.
The new critical line that the Council mandated was located at the
high tide line resulting from the storms. The setting of the new line
effectively expanded the area under the Council's permitting authority.
In situations in which the new critical area line intersected a building,
pool, or other development, the Council extended its jurisdiction to in-
clude the entire affected structure.27 The Council's new stiffer stan-
dards then foreclosed any possibility of a permit to rebuild in the
"new" jurisdictional area. This overnight expansion of the Coastal
Council's jurisdiction into privately developed areas caused some con-
tention. The Council's actions never were tested on the merits, how-
ever, because all challenges were settled.
28
However, Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council29 is an exam-
ple of a case that did not settle. Beard was somewhat different from
the other cases because the Coastal Council denied the property own-
ers, Robert and Alice Beard, permission to build new vertical seawalls
on their own property. The Beards' property consisted of four contigu-
ous lots in North Myrtle Beach. Three of the four lots had seawalls
some distance inland from the Beards' beachfront property line. The
Beards requested permission to build new seawalls on the beachfront
property line of all four lots. After the Council denied the application,
the Beards sued and alleged that the Council's denial of the permit
constituted an impermissible taking of the land between the existing
seawalls and the beachfront property line.20 Judge James E. Moore
25. See Afterdeck Homeowners Ass'n v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. 87-
CP-26-1477 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Oct. 15, 1987) (unpublished order of settlement agreement
between the parties recorded in Horry County).
26. See supra text accompanying note 15.
27. See Afterdeck Homeowners Ass'n v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. 87-
CP-26-1477 (S.C. Ct. C.P. June 1, 1987) (unpublished order for a temporary injunction
recorded in Horry County).
28. Id.
29. No. 88-CP-26-3503 (S.C. Ct. C.P. filed Sept. 30, 1988).
30. The Beards first exhausted their administrative remedies by appealing the de-
1991]
5
Smith: Analysis of the Regulation of Beachfront Development in South Car
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
held that the Council had the authority to regulate the area, but that
the regulation was a taking in this case.3 1 The Coastal Council ap-
pealed this ruling.32
Beard is distinguishable from Carter v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.33 In Carter the supreme court held that denial of a permit to
fill a wetland was not a taking in the constitutional sense.34 The wet-
land in Carter was a high marsh,35 which supported salt tolerant spe-
cies of plants. The Coastal Council denied the owner's proposal to fill
the wetland so that he could build a house. The court determined that:
While unquestionably respondent's wetland would have greater value
to him if it were filled, "fain owner of land has no absolute and unlim-
ited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to
use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and
which injures the rights of others."'38
The question in Beard was whether the sandy area between the
Beards' old walls and the proposed new walls fell within the Carter
principle of being unsuited in its natural state for man-made altera-
tion, and whether such an alteration would harm the rights of others.
37
In Beard the area seaward of the old wooden seawalls was barren at
the time of the permit decision, administrative appeal, and court ac-
tion. The area was subject only to storm-driven waves. Post-Hurricane
Hugo conditions are unknown and the court did not consider them on
appeal.38 The area in question was accreting and not eroding, according
nial directly to the South Carolina Coastal Council in April 1987. The agency made its
final decision in September 1988. The Beards then sued in the Horry County Circuit
Court on September 30, 1988. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, - S.C. -, 403 S.E.2d 620 (over-
turning Judge Moore and finding that the lower court's failure to challenge the legisla-
ture's findings and policies in the Coastal Zone Management Act and its finding that a
"substantial and legitimate state interest" was involved, was a concession that regulation
of the property was necessary to protect against serious public harm), petition for cert.
filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. July 16, 1991) (No. 91-137).
33. 281 S.C. 201, 314 S.E.2d 327 (1984).
34. Id. at 204, 314 S.E.2d at 329.
35. A high marsh is one located above the mean high water mark. Because the
State claims title to property below the mean high water mark, purely private property
can be regulated under Carter to the point that it will not be used except in its natural
state.
36. Carter, 281 S.C. at 205, 314'S.E.2d at 329 (quoting Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972)).
37. Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. 88-CP-26-3503 (S.C. Ct. C.P.
filed Sept. 30, 1988). Although the lower court did not focus on this question, the su-
preme court believed it was pivotal.
38. Hurricane Hugo slammed into South Carolina's coast on September 21, 1989.
Hurricane Hugo was the largest hurricane to strike the South Carolina coast since Hurri-
[Vol. 42
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to the South Carolina Coastal Council.39 The property was adjacent to
a public beach,40 and the new seawall would have kept the public off
the Beards' property seaward of the old seawall to the property line.4
1
This is noteworthy because of the dynamic tension between the public
and private rights along South Carolina's beaches.
Public access to and use of the beach is only one part of this ten-
sion. Also important is the private property interest and use of the
area seaward of the owner's old seawall. The public interest issue stems
from the potentially negative impact that some uses of this area might
have on the adjacent public beach. Judge Moore stated in Beard that
the Coastal Council used the public access argument almost exclusively
in its decision to deny the permit.42 The order does not reveal whether
Judge Moore would have ruled differently if he had found that a public
harm was being prevented, rather than that a public benefit was being
conferred in the form of a public access over private property. The
South Carolina Supreme Court appears to have determined that seri-
ous public harm would result from issuing the permit, thus justifying
its ruling that no taking occurred. This decision has been appealed to
the United States Supreme Court. 3
II. THE BEACH MANAGEMENT ACT
A complex and controversial amendment to the Coastal Zone
Management Act became effective in July 1988. The Beach Manage-
ment Act44 (Act) established a setback program for South Carolina's
Atlantic shoreline.4' The program expanded the jurisdiction and regu-
latory authority of the Coastal Council by enabling the Council to reg-
ulate comprehensively an area that was not a natural resource per se.
cane Hazel in 1954.
39. The Council denied the permit in part because an erosion control structure was
not needed on the accreting beach. Accretion is the buildup of sand on the beach, rather
than the erosion away of sand. If a beach is accreting, generally no seawall is needed.
40. In South Carolina the area below the mean high water line is public beach
under the public trust doctrine. Currently, no modem South Carolina cases exist that
pertain to the doctrine. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988), the South Carolina Supreme Court had the opportunity
to determine whether the mean high tide mark remains the modern measure for the
public trust doctrine. The court did not mention the doctrine in Beard.
41. Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. 88-CP-26-3503 (S.C. Ct. C.P.
filed Sept. 30, 1988).
42. Id.
43. Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, - S.C. , 403 S.E.2d 620, petition
for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. July 16 1991) (No. 91-137).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-270 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
45. Id. § 48-39-280.
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The setback area need not be a wetland, a sand dune, or a beach area
to fall under Coastal Council jurisdiction. The new beach and dune
critical area is determined by projecting the eventual location of the
beach and dunes, rather than by determining their current location.
48
This fundamental change in the Act led to a zoning-type program that
required expanded regulatory expertise by the Council. The Council's
discretion, however, is severely constrained by the Act's prohibitions
and specific requirements.
47
The Coastal Council's new jurisdiction encompasses two types of
zones: standard erosion zones and inlet erosion zones. The standard
erosion zone is a segment of shoreline that is subject to essentially the
same set of coastal processes and is not directly influenced by tidal
inlets or associated inlet shoals.4" An inlet erosion zone is a segment of
shoreline along or adjacent to a tidal inlet that is directly influenced by
the inlet and the inlet's associated shoals.49 The Act describes the es-
tablishment of the baseline in each zone.50 The baseline in the stan-
dard erosion zone is "the location of the crest of the primary ocean
front sand dune in that zone." 51 If erosion control structures or other
human actions have altered the shoreline, then the baseline is "where
the crest of the primary ocean front sand dunes for that zone would be
located if the shoreline had not been altered."52
Where inlets are not stabilized by a jetty or other structures, the
inlet erosion zone baseline has become the most landward position of
the shoreline during the past forty years. 53 If a scientific study shows
that the shoreline is unlikely to return to its former position, the Act
does not specify where the baseline should be established.54 If a study
is made, the Act mandates that the study must be part of the State
Comprehensive Beach Management Plan.55 The Act lists many compo-
nents that must be considered in order for the study to be complete. 6
46. See id. § 48-39-280(A)(1)-(3). The 1990 amendments make some clarifying
changes to these sections. The existing forty-year-setback requirement remains.
47. See, e.g., id. §§ 48-39-290(B)-(C), -300 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
48. Id. § 48-39-270(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
49. Id. § 48-39-270(7).
50. The baseline is the line from which the forty-year-setback line is measured.
51. SC. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(2).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. The study, to be completed as part of the State Comprehensive Beach Manage-
ment Plan, must consider, for example, "historical inlet migration, inlet stability, chan-
nel and ebb tidal delta changes, the effects of sediment bypassing on shorelines adjacent
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If an inlet is stabilized by a jetty or other structure, then the baseline
is established using the method described for standard erosion zones
with the condition that the actual crest of the dune be used, not the
projected location of the dune, regardless of the stabilizing structure."
Several problems arise under the statutory scheme. First, not all
stabilized inlet zones have primary oceanfront sand dunes."s It is very
difficult, if not impossible, to establish a baseline when there is not an
"actual" primary oceanfront sand dune in a stabilized inlet zone. In
these situations, a baseline has been established by projecting where
the crest of a dune should be, based on the presence of the stabilizing
structure.
Establishing baselines for zones that are severely eroded and for
inlet zones that are significantly accreted is also difficult. Because the
most landward historical position of the shoreline in a severely eroded
area is the current shoreline, the Act allows construction closer to the
public beach in eroded areas than it permits in accreting inlet zones.
The baseline for accreting areas sets development further from the
beach, because the forty-year historical shoreline is inland of the cur-
rent shoreline. This illogical result can be avoided only by conducting a
detailed historical and scientific study to show that the baseline should
be closer to the sea in accreting areas. It is not likely that such a study
will be conducted, however, to show that the baseline of a severely er-
oding shoreline should be moved inland.
The 1988 Act required the Coastal Council to establish an "in-
terim" baseline and setback line by the Act's effective date.5" This
compelled the Coastal Council to summarize available data quickly and
adopt the baseline, setback line, and erosion rates before the Act's ef-
fective date.60 Property owners may challenge interim lines and erosion
rates, as well as the lines and rates adopted as part of the State Com-
prehensive Beach Management Plan. The 1988 Act provided that
"[a]ny coastal riparian landowner adversely affected . . must be
57. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(3).
58. All of South Carolina's beaches from Charleston to Little River lost their dunes
during Hurricane Hugo. Only man-made dunes exist in this area now, and they may not
be in the location of the lost dunes. The Council will be required to interpret the Act if
stabilized inlet zone baseline determinations are challenged.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section also re-
quired that the lines be revised every five to ten years, but the Act prohibited moving
the line seaward after July 1, 1990. Id. The 1990 amendments delete the prohibition on
moving the line seaward, set July 3, 1991 as the date for adoption of a final line, and
change the revision period to require that the lines be revised every eight to ten years.
See id. § 43-39-280(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
60. The Coastal Council adopted these items on June 17, 1988 with the provision
that they were to become effective on July 1, 1988. See S.C. COASTAL COUNCIL, MEETING
MINUTES (June 17, 1988).
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granted a review of the setback line, baseline, or erosion rate" upon
submission of substantiating evidence."' The 1990 amendment allows
parties to appeal if they are "[a] landowner claiming ownership of
property affected. '62 Parties may appeal to the full Coastal Council,
and they may appeal the Council's decision to the courts.6 3 A signifi-
cant change in the 1990 amendments is that a party may challenge
only the final and revised lines under subsection 280(E).6' The provi-
sions of section 8 of Act 60,65 however, may allow parties to pursue
challenges that already have been filed or that could have been filed
under previous law, in spite of the amendment to subsection 280(E).
The interim baselines at many locations have been revised at least
once during the first eighteen months since the Act's adoption. The
final lines were adopted by the Council in June 1991.66
The dynamics of the beach system still can play a significant part
in any particular line review. For instance, the Coastal Council sur-
veyed the affected beaches immediately after Hurricane Hugo. If the
Council used the Hugo data in reviewing the interim baselines prior to
establishing final lines, the resulting baselines would be sited further
inland. The Coastal Council did not use the Hugo data for establishing
baselines, however, because the Act requires the use of forty years of
data to establish the new jurisdictional area.67 The Coastal Council es-
tablished baselines and erosion rates by reviewing available aerial pho-
tography and by measuring the erosion or accretion of the shoreline. A
certain degree of professional judgment must be used to determine the
erosion rate and baselines because the aerial photographs the engineers
used were not taken for this purpose. None of the photographs used
prior to July 1988 were even digitized or rectified.
Improved photographic technology will lead to a more precise
measurement of the setback line, which is currently figured by multi-
plying the annual erosion rate by forty. 8 The Act requires that a mini-
mum twenty-foot-setback line be established "even in cases where the
shoreline has been stable or has experienced net accretion over the
61. S.C. CoDe ANN. § 48-39-280(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
62. Id. (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
63. S.C. CODE REGs. 30-6, -7 (1976 & Supp. 1990).
64. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) with id.
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
65. This is an uncodified provision of the 1990 amendments to the Beach Manage-
ment Act. See 1990 S.C. Acts 607.
66. See S.C. COASTAL COUNCIL, MEETING MINUTES (July 1988-June 1991).
67. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). The Council re-
cently confirmed that it did not use Hugo data to review interim baselines or establish
final ones. Telephone interview with Deborah Hernandez, Coastal Council Staff Engineer
(July 22, 1991).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 42
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past forty years."6 9 This minimum setback line figures prominently in
the regulatory scheme described in the Act and is a good example of
the nondiscretionary requirements contained in the Act. Until the
adoption of the 1990 amendment, no new construction or reconstruc-
tion was allowed in this setback, with the exception of beach access
structures.7 0
III. PROPERTY TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
In addition to severely limiting the discretion of the Coastal Coun-
cil, the Act also contains a mandate for beachfront property owners
and others associated with real estate transactions that involve beach-
front property. South Carolina Code section 48-39-330 requires that
any contract of sale and any deed for transfers of real property located
wholly or partially seaward of the setback line must contain a disclo-
sure statement "reasonably calculated to call attention to the exis-
tence" of the Act's impact on that particular parcel.71
The Code is unclear, however, about how much detail is required
in the disclosure statement. The first portion of the section specifically
describes the information required in a disclosure (reference to setback
and baselines). The second portion of the section provides that any
language reasonably calculated to call attention to the mere existence
of the required information is satisfactory.
7 2
Apparently, the Act requires potential sellers to disclose that the
information about the setback exists, but does not require the poten-
tial sellers to reveal the actual information or its effects on the prop-
erty. In practice, plats are almost always used and all of the informa-,
tion is incorporated by reference into the deed. Therefore, this
requirement may cause individual property owners trouble because the
Coastal Council is not required to notify them when it changes the in-
terim erosion rate, the interim baseline, or the interim setback line. In
fact, public notice is not required for changes in the interim lines or
rates. Even though the final lines are established under the State Com-
prehensive Beach Management Plan, which does have public notice re-
quirements, lawyers and property owners must contact the Coastal
Council to ensure that the information they include in the required
disclosure statement is accurate. Parties should check with the Coastal
69. Id. § 48-39-280(B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). The 1990 amendment changes
the language but maintains the twenty-foot minimum setback requirement. See id. § 48-
39-280(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
70. See id. § 48-39-290(A)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (allowing construction by
special permit only).
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Council because the setback line in some areas of the coast is several
hundred feet from the shoreline and a title examiner may have no
other way to determine whether the property he is researching requires
a disclosure statement.
No party has actually litigated the disclosure requirement, but a
failure to disclose probably would void the real estate transaction. An
alternative remedy would be to reform the contract, or perhaps to sub-
mit the issue of a fair sales price to arbitration. The 1990 amendment
provides "[tihe provisions of this section are regulatory in nature and
do not affect the legality of an instrument violating the provisions.' '7 3
It is unclear whether the 1990 amendment renders the requirement
toothless or whether an alternative penalty for nondisclosure exists.
IV. LOCAL PLANNING REQUIREMENT
The Act also places requirements on local governments. Local gov-
ernments must submit a local comprehensive beach management plan
to the Coastal Council within two years of the Act's effective date.
4 If
a local government fails to establish and enforce a local comprehensive
beach management plan in a timely manner, the Council must impose
either a local plan or the State Comprehensive Beach Management
Plan for the local government. Additionally, the local government will
automatically lose its eligibility to receive state money for beach pro-
tection, preservation, restoration, or enhancement. 75 To meet the Act's
requirements, the local plan must be comprehensive and it must in-
clude everything from an inventory of turtle nesting and important
habitats of the beach and dune system to a postdisaster plan.76 Public
access is also a significant component of the plan's requirements. Fi-
nally, the Coastal Council must develop a long-range, comprehensive
beach management plan.
77
V. BUILDING AND REBUILDING RESTRICTIONS
The 1988 Beach Management Act's most detailed, controversial,
and restrictive provisions are found in sections 48-39-290 and 48-39-
73. Id.
74. Id. § 48-39-350(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). This section outlines the data and
information that must be included in the local plan. The 1990 amendment sets July 1,
1991 as the deadline for submitting the local plan. Id. (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
75. Id. § 48.39-350(B).
76. See id. § 48-39-350(A)(1)-(10).
77. Id. § 48-39-320(A). The information that must be included in the plan is simi-
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300. These two sections prohibit construction or reconstruction of most
habitable structures seaward of the setback line.7 The building of new
structures and rebuilding of structures destroyed beyond repair is not
permitted seaward of the twenty-foot minimum setback line.79 If a set-
.back area landward of the minimum setback line is present, because of
erosion greater than six inches per year, any new construction in the
setback area is limited to habitable structures that are not larger than
five thousand square feet. 0 The 1990 amendments removed the blan-
ket prohibition against all construction in the minimum twenty-foot
zone, but restrictions on development and rebuilding between the
baseline and the setback line are still in force. Although development
and rebuilding is not prohibited completely, very severe restrictions
apply seaward of the baseline.81
The Council has determined that the Act covers an entire struc-
ture if any part of the structure is seaward of the setback line. A 10,000
square foot building, therefore, cannot be built half-in and half-out of
the setback area. The Act also limits the rebuilding of existing struc-
tures to the same square footage that existed prior to any destruction
of the building by natural causes or fire. 2 Additionally, the linear foot-
age along the coast of the rebuilt structure cannot exceed the linear
footage along the coast of the original structure.8 3 The limitations on
square footage and linear footage apply to repair work, as well as
rebuilding.
8 4
Under the 1988 Act, if the Council permitted an owner to rebuild
a structure destroyed beyond repair within the setback area, the Coun-
cil required that owner to renourish annually the beach in front of the
property with an amount and type of sand to be approved by the
Coastal Council. The Code required the owner to replace at least one
and one-half times the volume of sand annually lost to erosion. 85 The
renourishment requirement also applied to the replacement of erosion
control structures.8 8 The renourishment requirements did not apply,
however, if the structures were landward of an active government re-
78. See id. §§ 48-39-290, -300.
79. Id. 88 48-39-290(B), -300 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
80. Id. § 48-39-300. Prior to the 1990 amendments, the statute allowed construc-
tion of habitable structures in this area if there was not sufficient land to build on the lot
landward of the setback line. The Code required that new construction be "as far inland
as possible." Id.
81. See id. §§ 48-39-290(B)(1)(a)(ii), (B)(2)(b)(iv) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
82. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). The 1990 amendment changed
"fire" to "manmade causes." Id. § 48-39-290(B)(1)(b)(iii) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
83. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
84. Id. 8 48-39-290(A)(1)-(2).
85. Id. 8 48-39-290(B)(7).
86. Id. 8 48-39-290(C).
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nourishment project.8 7 The 1990 amendment removed the renourish-
ment requirement.8
The Beach Management Act prohibits construction of new erosion
control structures seaward of the setback line."' Under the 1988 Act,
existing erosion control structures that were more than fifty percent
damaged could be rebuilt only if they protected a habitable structure
and if they met the other requirements of section 48-39-290(C).90 The
statute prohibits reconstruction of a vertical structure, and no replace-
ment device can be located further out on the beach than where the
original erosion control structure was located."1 The 1988 Act required
that all vertical seawalls be replaced with sloping erosion control de-
vices within thirty years of the effective date of the Act.92
VI. BEACH MANAGEMENT ACT LITIGATION
Beachfront landowners have challenged the Beach Management
Act in both state and federal court. The federal court actions have
challenged the constitutionality of the statute. All of the plaintiffs in
pre-Hurricane Hugo actions alleged that the application of the Act was
an unconstitutional taking of their property. The post-Hugo actions in
state court also have alleged a taking and have focused on the loss of
swimming pools and erosion control structures on developed property.
The first case filed under the Beach Management Act was Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.9 3 The case involved two undeveloped
oceanfront lots in the Wild Dunes subdivision on the Isle of Palms.
David H. Lucas purchased two lots in 1986, one for $475,000 and the
other for $500,000.1" Lucas argued that application of the Act was a
taking of his property without just compensation because the Act pro-
hibits any construction other than a walkway to the beach and a small
87. See id. §§ 48-39-290(B)(7), (C).
88. See id. § 48-39-290 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
89. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(2)(a).
90. Id. § 48-39-290(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). The 1990 amendment does not
allow rebuilding if more than a certain percentage of the erosion control structure is
destroyed. The percentage of the structure that may be destroyed without application of
the rebuilding prohibition varies depending on the structure's destruction date. The
amendment prohibits rebuilding if more than 80% of the structure is destroyed prior to
June 30, 1995; more than 62 2/3% of the structure is destroyed prior to June 30, 2005;
and more than 50% of the structure is destroyed after June 30, 2005. Id. § 48-39-
290(B)(2)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
91. Id. § 48-39-290(C)(1)-(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
92. Id. § 48-39-290(C).
93. No. 88-CP-10-66 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Aug. 7, 1989), rev'd, - S.C. _, 404 S.E.2d 895
(1991).
94. Id., slip op. at 1.
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deck.95 The court agreed and awarded Lucas $1,232,387.50 in compen-
sation, plus interest until satisfaction of the judgment. The court chose
this compensation amount based on the fair market value, estimated at
$1,170,000, property taxes of $3,400, and simple interest on the mort-
gage balance of $58,987.50.98 The South Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed the circuit court in February 1991.
s1
In the trial court decision, the Coastal Council asserted that no
unconstitutional taking had occurred. As an affirmative defense, the
Council further argued that even if application of the Act amounted to
a taking, Lucas was limited to administrative relief.98 The Council ar-
gued that there had been no taking because (1) the restriction on the
use of the property merely prohibited the owner from using it in a way
that would injure others; (2) the restrictions prohibited a use for which
the property is not suited; and (3) the Council had not denied the
plaintiff all viable economic use of the property." The Council also ar-
gued that even if the court found that an unconstitutional taking had
occurred, the remedy was issuance of a permit rather than
compensation. 100
To support the first argument the Coastal Council relied on histor-
ical facts about the property. Testimony from an expert in coastal
processes indicated that the area had been under water in 1963.11 Ac-
cording to the Coastal Council, erosion in this accreting area is episodic
and occurs when inlet shoals attach to the island as part of the accre-
tion process. 10 2 As the shoal, or sandbar, migrates and attaches to the
island, the direction of wave attack changes in a way that severely er-
odes the adjacent areas on either side. Up to three hundred feet of
erosion could occur very quickly in this process. The Coastal Council
maintains that this process will reoccur in this area at some point in
the future. The Council argued, therefore, that the area is not suitable
for development because it someday will be subject to severe erosion
even though the island currently is accreting.01
The Coastal Council's public harm argument focused on the
95. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
96. Id., slip op. at 8.
97. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, - S.C. -, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991).
98. Lucas, No. 88-CP-10-66, slip op. at 3.
99. See Coastal Council Trial Memorandum at 13-14, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, No. 88-CP-10-66 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Aug. 7, 1989).
100. Lucas, No. 88-CP-10-66, slip op. at 3.
101. See Trial Transcript at 111, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. 88-
CP-10-66 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Aug. 7, 1989) (expert testimony of Christopher Jones).
102. See id. at 102.
103. See Coastal Council Trial Memorandum at 14. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, No. 88-CP-10-66 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Aug. 7, 1989).
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coastal dynamics of the Isle of Palms. The dynamics of the area even-
tually would cause any development to be harmed by the inevitable
movement of shoals onto the island. If the development were in the
active wave zone, it would harm the public beach by increasing erosion,
and thereby disrupt public access to the beach.
The Coastal Council also argued that the land still had viable eco-
nomic value.104 The Council supported its argument that economic
value remained in the property with testimony that the lot was worth
no more than $56,000 under the Act's restrictions. 105 Nevertheless, the
circuit court considered only fair market value for a totally restricted
oceanfront lot as the basis for a finding that a taking had occurred. 10 8
The Council predicated its argument for an alternative remedy to
compensation on the original language of the Coastal Management
Act.107 Section 48-39-180 of the Act indicates that:
If the court finds the action to be an unreasonable exercise of the po-
lice power it shall enter a finding that the action shall not apply to the
land of the plaintiff, or in the alternative, that the Council shall pay
reasonable compensation for the loss of use of the land. 108
Section 48-39-290(B) of the 1988 Act provides that "[i]f the judgment
is in favor of petitioner, the order shall require the State to either issue
the necessary permits for reconstruction of the structure or, in the al-
ternative, to provide reasonable compensation for the loss of use of the
land." 0  The 1988 Act's remedial language only applied to habitable
structures destroyed beyond repair,"0 but the 1990 amendment ex-
tends this remedy to all property owners affected by the Act."'
The Council argued that the original remedial language of the Act
found in section 48-39-180" 2 should apply to prohibitions on new con-
struction because the 1988 Act did not provide the same remedy for
prohibitions on rebuilding."' The Council argued that the language in
section 48-39-180, which provides that "a finding that the action shall
104. Id. at 16.
105. See Trial Transcript at 148-49, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No.
88-CP-10-66 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Aug. 7, 1989) (expert testimony of Chris Donato).
106. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. 88-CP-10-66, slip op. at 8
(S.C. Ct. C.P. Aug. 7, 1989), rev'd, - S.C. -, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991).
107. S.C. Corm ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1990).
108. Id. § 48-39-180 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
109. Id. § 48-39-290(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
110. See id.
111. See id. § 48-39-305 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
112. Id. § 48-39-180 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
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not apply to the land of the plaintiff,"11 4 should be equivalent to the
issuance of a permit.115 The Council's position is that if the court finds
that the action does not apply to the plaintiff's land, it should require
the Council to issue a permit. 1 6
The Council's attorney raised the issue of an alternative remedy in
Lucas. Although the Council briefed the issue, Judge Patterson dis-
cussed no alternative remedy in his order. Patterson's order awarded
compensation to Lucas, and the alternative remedy issue became irrel-
evant. Because the supreme court reversed the lower court it did not
reach this issue.
Even if the South Carolina Coastal Council had succeeded in forc-
ing an alternative remedy to compensation, however, other legal issues
and practical considerations would remain. A landowner may be enti-
tled to temporary damages. The United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles 17 suggests that if a regulation is found to be a taking, com-
pensation should be awarded for the period prior to the court's ulti-
mate determination. This is true even if the regulation is voluntarily
removed, or as in this case, found not to apply to the petitioner's land.
Additionally, a determination that the governmental action does not
apply to the petitioner's property does not mean necessarily that the
Council should issue a permit to allow construction in the otherwise
prohibited area.
Notwithstanding temporary damages, one may further argue that
if the prohibition does not apply to the petitioner's land, the Council
does not have the power to regulate the land's use. On the other hand,
one could argue that the inapplicable "action" is the establishment or
enforcement of the Beach Management Act's new jurisdictional area.
As with the temporary damages issue, the courts have not yet had to
face this issue directly.
When the court awards damages for a taking, temporary damages
clearly will not be an issue. The issue of temporary damages arises only
if the plaintiff gets the alternative remedy of requiring the Council to
issue a permit that allows development in the otherwise prohibited
area. When a court decides the temporary damages issue, as well as the
issue of payment of attorney's fees, new precedent will be set in this
dynamic area of regulatory law.
114. Id. § 48-39-180 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
115. See Coastal Council Trial Memorandum at 19-20, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, No. 88-CP-10-66 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Aug. 7, 1989).
116. Id.
117. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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VII. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND OTHER STATE LITIGATION
Lucas was not the only lawsuit filed in state court by a Wild
Dunes landowner. A similar case, Curry v. State,118 involved a lot near
the ones Mr. Lucas owns. The facts of Lucas and Curry were essen-
tially the same and, notably, Judge Patterson heard both cases.119
However, unlike Lucas, the court did directly address the issue of
an alternative remedy in Curry. In response to the Council's argument
that the plaintiff's remedy should be limited to administrative action,
Judge Patterson held that "[tihe controlling Act does not indicate this
to be proper under the facts of this case. Furthermore, the Constitu-
tional provisions under which plaintiff claims, have long been held to
be self-executing and do not require independent statutory authoriza-
tion.1 2 The judge awarded the plaintiff $677,681.94 in damages plus
mortgage interest that had accrued from the date the plaintiff filed the
suit.1 21 The court also awarded postjudgment interest.
1 2
In addition to Curry and Lucas, the Act has been litigated in the
federal courts. On October 12, 1989, Judge Falcon Hawkins decided
three cases concerning South Carolina's Beach Management Act.123
The first case, Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council,1 24 was a
suit by twenty-five single-family lot owners on Hilton Head Island. All
of the lots were developed with residential dwellings and appurtenant
structures. The Esposito plaintiffs alleged that the Act was unconstitu-
tional and that application of the Act resulted in a taking of their
property.125
The second case, Feuer v. South Carolina Coastal Council,1 26 was
a suit by an owner of a Hilton Head condominium affected by the Act.
Feuer also challenged the constitutionality of the Act and claimed that
a taking had occurred. 27 The third action, Chavous v. South Carolina
118. No. 89-CP-10-0076 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Feb. 6, 1990).
119. See id.
120. Curry, No. 89-CP-10-0076, slip op. at 9.
121. Id., slip op. at 11.
122. Id.
123. Chavous v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 745 F. Supp. 1168 (D.S.C. 1989)
vacated as moot sub nom. Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. 89-1840 (4th
Cir. July 3, 1991); Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. D:88-2055-1 (D.S.C.
Oct. 13, 1989), affd, No. 89-1840 (4th Cir. July 3, 1991); Feuer v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, No. D:88-3073-1 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 1989).
124. No. D:88-2055-1 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 1989), aff'd, No. 89-1840 (4th Cir. July 3,
1991).
125. See id., slip op. at 1.
126. No. D:88-3073-1 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 1989).
127. See id., slip op. at 1.
[Vol. 42
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss3/6
BEACHFRONT MANAGEMENT ACT
Coastal Council,128 was a suit by the owner of an undeveloped ocean-
front lot similarly situated to the lots in Lucas and Curry.29
In all three cases Judge Hawkins ruled that the Act was not un-
constitutional on its face.130 The Act's statutory restrictions were, ac-
cording to the judge, "substantially related to the important goal of
preserving South Carolina's beaches." 13 Furthermore, in Feuer and
Esposito the court ruled that the plaintiffs had not suffered a taking.
32
The court found in Feuer and Esposito that the plaintiffs had suffered
no concrete injury to the relevant property because of the application
of the Act. The court found:
[W]hile it is undisputed that the plaintiffs' homes are located within
this no construction zone, there is no evidence indicating that any of
them has been denied permission to build, or rebuild, any structure or
recreational amenity within this area. Additionally, although the rec-
ord contains evidence that several of the plaintiffs have been unable
to sell their homes, that situation is not the result of any direct re-
striction on alienability contained in the statutes. Rather, this situa-
tion is the result of a chilling effect on the real estate market caused
by the enactment of the statutes. 133
In Chavous Judge Hawkins found that, as applied to the plaintiffs,
the Act effected a taking.134 Even though the plaintiffs had not peti-
tioned for a change in the jurisdictional lines, the court held that such
a request would have been futile. 135 The court also noted that the
availability of an inverse condemnation action in state court is uncer-
tain.1 6 Thus the issue was ripe for resolution. The court also stated
that it was "immediately apparent that the plaintiffs [had] demon-
strated an economic injury sufficient to invoke the protection of the
takings clause.' 37 The court distinguished a facial challenge from a
challenge to the enforcement of a statute and focused entirely on the
economic impact of the specific applications of the Act to the Chavous
128. No. D: 89-0216-1 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 1989).
129. See Chavous v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 745 F. Supp. 1168, 1169
(D.S.C. 1990) (the lot was similar because it was an undeveloped oceanfront lot), vacated
as moot sub nom. Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. 89-1840 (4th Cir. July
3, 1991).
130. See Chavous, 745 F. Supp. at 1170-71; Esposito, No. D:88-2055-1, slip op. at 4,
8; Feuer, No. D:88-3073-1, slip op. at 4, 7-8.
131. Esposito, No. D::88-2055-1, slip op. at 4; Feuer, No. D:88-3 703-1, slip op. at 4.
132. Esposito, No. D:88-2055-1, slip op. at 4; Feuer, No. D:88-3073-1, slip op. at 4.
133. Esposito, No. D:88-2055-1, slip op. at 6 (citations omitted); see also Feuer, No.
D:88-3073-1, slip op. at 6 (substantially similar language).
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property. 138 Under the Act the plaintiffs could build only a small deck
or a walkway to the beach on their property. Because the plaintiffs'
options were so limited, the court held that no remaining economically
viable use existed for the property.139
After the court ordered that a taking had occurred, the court held
a hearing on damages.14 0 At the hearing the Coastal Council argued
that a mere injunction would be an appropriate remedy and also vigor-
ously argued that the court could consider only the fair market value
of the property and property taxes for money damages. 4 1 The plain-
tiffs sought compensation for the value of the property as shown by
their expenses to purchase and maintain it. They also sought prospec-
tive relief for the loss of rental income. Judge Hawkins ruled in favor
of the Coastal Council and limited the plaintiffs' recovery to prospec-
tive injunctive relief. The court found that the State of South Carolina
had not waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution. A federal court, therefore, could not award
money damages.142
However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently has af-
firmed Esposito143 and vacated the judgment in Chavous with instruc-
tions on remand to dismiss the case as moot. The Fourth Circuit found
that the 1990 amendments to the Act were significant and made the
contest of the 1988 Act moot. The Fourth Circuit also ruled that it had
no jurisdiction over the damages claim since the district court's ruling
that the Eleventh Amendment barred payment of damages was not ap-
pealed. Since the injunctive relief ordered by the district court was
moot, the Fourth Circuit expressed no opinion on the district court's
determination that the 1988 Act effected a taking of the Chavous's
property. The Fourth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the Act
in Esposito and found that the stated purpose of the General Assembly
to "protect, preserve, restore, and enhance the beach/dune system con-
stituted a legitimate State interest and exercise of the police power of
the State.11 44 This finding was analogized to a similar finding in Key-
stone v. Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis 45 and, in a footnote,
the Fourth Circuit noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court had
relied upon Keystone in deciding in Lucas that no taking had oc-
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1170. The court also noted that the property previously had been very
valuable. Id.
140. See id. (order resulting from damages hearing on January 23, 1990).
141. See id. at 1170.
142. Id. at 1170-72.
143. Esposito v. Sopth Carolina Coastal Council, No. 89-1840 (4th Cir. July 3, 1991).
144. Id., slip op. at 7.
145. 480 U.S. 470 (1982).
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curred. Thus, the Fourth Circuit found under a Keystone analysis that
the Act substantially advanced legitimate state interests.146
Also, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Act
did not deny plaintiffs the viable economic use of their property. The
possible reduction of value or of market attractiveness was addressed,
but rejected as insufficient to find a taking. The Esposito plaintiffs'
due process claim was also rejected because of the court's finding that
the 1988 Act was substantially related to the legitimate state interests
in protecting its beaches.
147
VIII. THE TAKING ANALYSIS
The legal argument that not all viable economic use of property is
destroyed when all practical use is prohibited is found in a line of cases
concerning regulatory takings, which culminates with Florida Rock In-
dustries, Inc. v. United States.148 In Florida Rock the United States
Army Corps of Engineers denied a phosphate mining permit applica-
tion in Florida.1 49 The claims court decided that the government's ac-
tion denied the plaintiff all economic use of the land, and this
amounted to a taking. 50 In overturning the claims court, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reasoned that a "market made up of
investors who are real but speculating in whole or major part" would
provide sufficient remaining use to prevent the finding that a taking
occurred."1 Judge Patterson found no such remaining use in Lucas.
1 52
Federal courts-seldom find a taking when there is government reg-
ulation. The relatively few decided cases do not provide a specific
formula for determining when a taking occurs. 153 The legal tests in a
taking analysis include a due process review to determine whether the
regulation reasonably advances a legitimate state interest and, more
fundamentally, a determination of whether all economically viable use
of the property has been prohibited.' As with the Beach Management
146. Esposito, No. 89-1840, slip op. at 7.
147. Id.
148. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
149. Id. at 895-96.
150. Id. at 897.
151. Id. at 903.
152. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. 88-CP-10-66, slip op. at 7
(S.C. Ct. C.P. Aug. 7, 1989) ("It is manifest that the South Carolina Coastal Council in
its enforcement of the Beach Management Act, has deprived Lucas of all of the essential
elements of ownership."), rev'd, - S.C. -, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991).
153. The Supreme Court, instead, has chosen to base its decisions on ad hoc factual
inquiries. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
154. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
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Act, legitimate state interests may be advanced by the government reg-
ulation. Nonetheless, when applied to particular situations, an individ-
ual may bear a significant loss.
Courts must also review whether the burden of the regulation is
"borne by the public as a whole. '155 The Court has yet to state what is
fair by this standard. The inquiry would seem to require a balancing of
the loss of value against the public purpose served and the presence or
absence of others similarly situated to share the burden. In Agins v.
City of Tiburon'56 the Court upheld the development-restricting land
use ordinances at issue and stated that:
The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public by
serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly development
of residential property with provision for open-space areas. There is
no indication that the appellants' 5-acre tract is the only property af-
fected by the ordinances. Appellants therefore will share with other
owners the benefits and burdens of the city's exercise of its police
power. In assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinances, these bene-
fits must be considered along with any diminution in market value
that the appellants might suffer.
157
In Andrus v. Allard"' the Court considered a regulation that prohib-
ited purchase and sale of federally protected birds. The court stated:
"It is true that appellees must bear the cost of these regulations. But,
within limits, that is a burden borne to secure 'the advantage of living
and doing business in a civilized community.' )7159
The earliest statement from the Supreme Court on regulatory tak-
ings is found in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 060 In Pennsylvania
Coal Justice Holmes stated that "if regulation goes too far, it will be
recognized as a taking."1 61 Justice Holmes' statement refers to the ex-
tent to which a regulation causes a diminution in property value. Jus-
tice Holmes also stated, however, that some diminution of value is per-
missible because the government would be hard pressed to continue "if
to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law."" 2
The means to determine the diminution in value that results from
(1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
155. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
156. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
157. Id. at 262.
158. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
159. Id. at 67 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922)).
160. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
161. Id. at 415.
162. Id. at 413.
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government regulation is not based on fixed criteria.163 Diminution in
value, rather, is to be determined by the ad hoc inquiry announced by
the Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.'1'
However, the Court has held that landowners are not constitutionally
entitled to the most beneficial use of their land if other beneficial uses
remain.18 5
To determine the impact of regulation on the value of property,
courts also have given consideration to the investment-backed expecta-
tions of the owners. 8 The Court discussed investment-backed expec-
tations in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,17 one of the few federal
cases in which the court found a taking. In Kaiser developers created a
navigable pond by dredging a channel through a beach to a private
pond. The developers built a marina on the pond. The United States
Army Corps of Engineers sued the developers and sought to establish
jurisdiction over the newly navigable waters and compel public access
to the pond. 8 Allowing free public access to the pond presumably de-
creased the value of the development.169 The Kaiser Court held that
the government's action amounted to the deprivation of an economic
advantage that was entitled to the protection of law. 17 0 The developers'
163. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
There is no fixed formula to determine how much diminution in market value
is allowable without the fifth amendment coming into play. We are not cited
to, nor have we found, cases comparing the owner's investment or basis with
the market value subject to the regulation and applying any rule or formula
with respect thereto, but we deem that a relevant consideration for exercise of
a value judgment.
Id.
164. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
165. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) ("If this ordi-
nance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police powers, the fact that it deprives
the property of most of its beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional.").
166. See Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 900-01.
[W]e have eschewed the development of any set formula for identifying a "tak-
ing".., and have relied instead on ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circum-
stances of each particular case.. . . To aid in this determination, however, we
have identified three factors which have "particular significance": (1) "the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; (2) "the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"; and
(3) "the character of the government action."
Id. (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)) (altera-
tions in original).
167. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
168. Id. at 167-69.
169. See id. at 169 ("[P]etitioners had invested millions of dollars on the assump-
tion that it was a privately owned pond leased to them.").
170. Id. at 178.
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lost advantage thus required just compensation.1 7 1
A more fundamental inquiry in taking cases is whether the govern-
ment regulation prevents a public harm. 17 2 A court may discuss this
point explicitly, as in Just v. Marinette County,7 3 or merely implicitly
if it analyzes whether the government regulation substantially ad-
vances legitimate state interests. A judicial holding that the regulation
advances a legitimate state interest, however, does not end the inquiry.
Particularly in a due process analysis, a court may determine whether,
all other factors militating against a taking, a taking nonetheless occurs
because the government regulation confers a public benefit instead of
protecting against a public harm at substantial cost to the claimant.
The lower court decision in Lucas appears to be an example of a case
in which this is a factor, though not the controlling one, and the su-
preme court specifically found that serious public harm was being pre-
vented by the state's action.
7 4
Like the United States Constitution, the South Carolina Constitu-
tion provides compensation for the taking of private property for pub-
lic use. 17 5 The state constitutional provision reads: "Except as other-
wise provided in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken
for private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use
without just compensation being first made therefor." 7 6 A governmen-
tal taking of property, therefore, automatically gives rise to a cause of
action for just compensation. No need exists for further supporting
legislation.
77
South Carolina can be characterized as a "property rights" state.
In this regard, the South Carolina Supreme Court once indicated:
Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and posses-
sion, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal.
Anything which destroys one or more of these elements of property to
that extent destroys the property itself. It must be conceded that the
substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right of use be de-
nied, the value of the property is annihilated, and ownership is ren-
171. Id. at 180.
172. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92
(1987).
173. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 10-11, 201 N.W.2d 761, 765 (1972).
174. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, No. 88-CP-10-66, slip op. at 6
(S.C. Ct. C.P. Aug. 7, 1989), rev'd, - S.C. , 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991) ("[T]he Beachfront
Management Act was enacted to preserve the state's beaches for the benefit of the gen-
eral public.").
175. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
176. Id.
177. See Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 159 S.C. 481, 493-97, 157
S.E. 842, 847-48 (1931).
[Vol. 42
24
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss3/6
BEACHFRONT MANAGEMENT ACT
dered a barren right."8
The South Carolina Supreme Court has stated that under article
1, section 13 of the South Carolina Constitution no distinction exists
between "taking" and "damaging."1 9 According to the court the depri-
vation of the ordinary beneficial use and enjoyment of property is
equivalent to a taking.8 0 Almost all of the South Carolina cases for an
inverse condemnation or taking by a government entity, however, have
involved actual physical encroachment or other effect on the property.
A case in point is Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Public Ser-
vice Authority.'' In Rice Hope Plantation a diversion of the Santee
River into the Cooper River caused previously fresh water adjacent to
the plaintiff's property to become saline. Damages were awarded for
the result.8 2
The supreme court also has held that property must be taken for a
public use for compensation to be due. The court stated:
The term public use is an elastic one and must keep abreast of chang-
ing social conditions, and the question is one of fact in each particular
case.. . . As long as the use is of benefit, utility or advantage to the
public, the use is a public one within the meaning of the law of emi-
nent domain. Public health, recreation and enjoyment are recognized
public uses.' 8
The court's language is particularly damaging because of the language
of the Beach Management Act that focuses on the tourism industry
and the recreational opportunities of the beach.1
8
4
178. Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 21, 8 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1940) (citation
omitted) (overruled on the sovereign immunity issue in McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243,
329 S.E.2d 741 (1985)).
179. Id. at 21-22, 8 S.E.2d at 873-74.
180. Id.
181. 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
182. Id. at 513, 59 S.E.2d at 136.
183. Timmons v. South Carolina Tri-Centennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 391, 175
S.E.2d 805, 812 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
184. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250, -260 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). The Act
indicates:
The beach dune system along the coast of South Carolina is extremely impor-
tant to the people of this state and serves the following functions:
(b) ... The tourists who come to the South Carolina coast to enjoy the
ocean and dry sand beach contribute significantly to state and local tax
revenues;
(d) provides a natural health environment for the citizens of South Car-
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In Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council185 the South Carolina
Supreme Court found that valid police power regulation which pre-
vents beneficial use of property can exist.188 The court also has found
that "the mere diminution in the market value of land by virtue of
adoption of a zoning ordinance does not constitute a taking."187 The
South Carolina Supreme Court in the wake of the United States Su-
preme Court decisions concerning takings, however, clearly has shown
that the threshold for beginning this analysis is very high. Lucas pro-
vides guidance for the cases being brought as a result of the Beach
Management Act,
IX. CONCLUSION
The Beach Management Act of 1988 provoked legal, as well as po-
litical debate even before Hurricane Hugo ravaged South Carolina's
shoreline. The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on what
constitutes a taking under South Carolina's Beach Management Act,
though the Act's effects have been challenged in both South Carolina
state courts and in the federal courts. At least one case has a petition
for a writ of certiorari pending before the United States Supreme
Court.188 Thus, not only can the South Carolina General Assembly
amend the Act, but the United States Supreme Court might further
outline and clarify the regulatory taking criteria.
Because of the fact-specific effect of the Beach Management Act
on individual parcels of property, issues must be resolved on a case-by-
case basis. Therefore, the Beach Management Act probably will result
in an important line of cases that will significantly clarify and augment
regulatory takings law in South Carolina.
Id. § 48-39-250(1).
The Act further provides that:
The policy of South Carolina is to: (1) Protect, preserve, restore, and enhance
the beach/dune system, the highest and best uses of which are declared to
provide:
(b) a source for the preservation of dry sand beaches which provide rec-
reation and a major source of state and local business revenue;
(c) an environment which harbors natural beauty and enhances the well-
being of the citizens of this State and its visitors ....
Id. § 48-39-260(1).
185. 281 S.C. 201, 314 S.E.2d 327 (1984).
186. Id. at 204-05, 314 S.E.2d at 329.
187. Brabham v. City of Sumter, 275 S.C. 597, 598, 274 S.E.2d 297, 297 (1981).
188. Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, - S.C. ., 403 S.E.2d 620, petition
for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. July 16, 1991) (No. 91-137).
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